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Protecting Minors From Online Pornography
Without Violating the First Amendment:
Mandating an Affirmative Choice
Robert A. Gomez*
Abstract: In view of Congress' failed efforts to prevent children from
viewing pornography and other indecent and harmful materials on the Internet, this article proposes that Congress pass a law which requires all new
personal computers to come equipped with blocking and filtering software
that requires the activating user to make an affirmative choice, during the
computer's initial setup, regarding the computer's filter settings for each account on the computer.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last fifty years, few technological inventions have surpassed the
impact or potential of the Internet. The possibility for human interaction is
unparalleled. With the click of a mouse, people can post anything online and
within minutes it becomes available to millions around the world. Unfortunately, the Internet has a dark side. Lurking behind all of its positive qualities is a seemingly endless collection of pornography. For most adults, this is
a relatively minor annoyance. However, it poses a grave threat for
America's youth.
Online pornography is a multi-billion dollar industry that consists of
over 4.2 million websites and roughly 372 million pages.' According to a
recent study, the largest consumers of online pornography are children between the ages of twelve and seventeen. 2 The same study found that "eighty
percent of fifteen to seventeen-year-olds have had multiple exposures to
hard-core pornography, and ninety percent of eight to sixteen-year-olds have
viewed pornography online, most often while doing their homework."3 Perhaps most disturbing is that certain providers specifically target children by
creating websites with Internet addresses similar to the names of popular
children's figures, shows, and movies. 4 For example, thousands of pornoRobert A. Gomez is an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, specializing in litigation. Mr. Gomez received an undergraduate degree from the University of California Los Angeles and a juris doctorate from Yale Law School.
Mr. Gomez wishes to thank Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres for his insightful
comments and invaluable guidance, and his supportive family.
1.

See William H. Jordan, ProtectingSpeech v. ProtectingChildren: An Examination of the Judicial Refusal to Allow Legislative Action in the Realm of Minors

and Internet Pornography,57 S.C. L. REv. 489, 489 (2006) (discussing general
information regarding online pornography and children).
2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.
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graphic links are named after or attached to popular children's characters
such as Pokeman and Action Man.5 In essence, trickery is used to cause
inadvertent exposure. 6 Exposure also occurs through more traditional routes.
For example, one study found that twenty-eight percent of exposures occur
when opening Email or clicking on links contained in Emails or Instant
Messages.7
Despite estimates that eleven million minors view pornographic websites each week,8 pinning down the exact psychological effects has proven to
be a challenging task. Due to ethical and moral concerns associated with
purposely exposing children to pornography, no study has directly monitored
pornography's impact on minors. Nevertheless, there is general consensus
that pornography has a detrimental effect on impressionable youths.9 Certain
studies suggest that pornographic stimulation "has a negative impact similar
to that of being exposed to extreme violence at such tender years."o Other
studies allege that youths prone to aggressive behavior may be triggered to
act on their inhibitions as a result of exposure to online pornography."1
Lastly, youths exposed to online pornography may use the material as a social cue for what is appropriate and acceptable sexual behavior.12 Although
adult entertainment is only supposed to be fantasy, there is a strong possibil5.

Jerry Ropelato, Internet PornographyStatistics, Internet FilterReviews, http://

intemet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
6.

Steven E. Merlis, Preserving Internet Expression While Protecting Our Children: Solutions Following Ashcroft v. ACLU, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.

117, *6 (2005).
7.

8.

9.

Emily R. Novak, Lost in Cyberspace: An Analysis of How the Supreme Court
May Help Children Find Their Way Safely on the Internet, 14 DEPAuL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. 325, 326 (2004).
Michael J. Kuhn, Still, What's So Compelling? - The Supreme Court's Continued Application of the Ginsberg Analysis and Its Effect on the Attempted Regulation of Internet Pornographyin Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,
542 U.S. 656 (2004), 84 NEB. L. REV. 1280, 1281 (2006).
Jacob A. Sosnay, Regulating Minors' Access to PornographyVia the Internet:
What Options Do Congress Have Left, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 453, 454 (2005); see generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,
Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) (explaining

how pornography creates negative perspectives of the roles of adults engaging
in sexual intercourse, while objectifying women in the process).
10. Sosnay, supra note 9, at 454; see Richard B. Felson, Mass Media Effects on
Violent Behavior, 22 ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 103, 103-28 (1996) (reviewing studies that demonstrate that viewing pornography increases the likelihood that one will become violent more easily if provoked).
11. Sosnay, supra note 9, at 454.
12.

See Steven D. Burt, Strict Scrutiny in Cyberspace: The Invalidation of the
CommunicationsDecency Act and the Slow Demise of the Child Online Protec-
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ity that exposure could "'negatively affect boys' relationships with girls and,
later on, women,' and that 'many young women ...

accept their own sexual

activities and responses (and those of their male partners) should mirror those
seen in sexual-fantasy media."13

To its credit, Congress recognized these threats at an early stage in the
Internet's development and responded by enacting bills such as the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"),
and the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"). Through these Acts,
Congress has forcefully attempted to limit and prevent the opportunities for
minors to be exposed to online pornography. However, because both the
CDA and COPA restricted speech on the basis of its content, courts struck
them down for violating the First Amendment.14 As a result, CIPA is the sole
law currently being enforced.15
In the aftermath of the CDA and COPA, this article argues that Congress should pass a law requiring all new computers to come with blocking
and filtering software. This software should require the buyer (i.e., parents)
to make an affirmative choice, during the initial setup, regarding the computer's filter settings for each account on the computer. Part I discusses the
First Amendment issues involved with attempting to restrict minors access to
pornography on the Internet. Part I examines the statutory provisions and
legal history of the CDA, COPA, and CIPA. Finally, Part III lays out a
detailed argument for the implementation of a law that requires buyers to
make a mandatory decision regarding the configuration of the computer's
filter settings.
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

One of the core requirements of the Constitution is that "Congress shall
make no law ...

abridging the freedom of speech."16 As a matter of princi-

ple, every branch of the Government has attempted to remain faithful to this
guarantee. However, in practice, absolute freedom of speech is neither feasible nor desirable.'7 In the famous words of Justice Holmes, "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
tion Act, 8 J.L. FAM.

STUD.

241 (2006) (discussing the impact of pornography

on minors).
13.

Id. at 242 (quoting Kimberly Marlowe Hartnett, Porn: It's Here, It's There, It's
Everywhere ... , THE SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at Li).

14.

See infra Part II.A-B.

15.

See infra Part II.C.

16.

U.S.

17.

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (stating "the unconditional
phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance.").

CONST.

amend. I.
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fire in a theatre and causing a panic."18 In essence, words that "create a clear
and present danger" are not entitled to First Amendment protection.19 And
just to provide another example, libel is another form of speech that is not
within the zone of constitutionally protected speech.20
The forms of regulation pertinent to this article are obscenity and indecency. In Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court distinguished obscenity
from sex. 2' According to Justice Brennan, sex is "a great mysterious force in
human life ... [that] has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to
mankind through the ages[J"22 Accordingly, the portrayal of sex "in art,
literature and scientific works is not itself sufficient reason to deny material
the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press."23 Obscene material, on the other hand, "deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest."24
Several years after Roth, in Miller v. California,the Court provided a
test for courts to apply when determining whether material is obscene and,
consequently, not protected by the First Amendment:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.25
Much like other communications, if material posted on the Internet does not
violate this standard, it is entitled to "the same First Amendment protection
as traditional speech."26 However, courts have also recognized that different
rules apply to material that can be accessed by minors.
In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited "the sale to minors under 17 years
18.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

19.

Id.

20.
21.

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
See Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.
25.

Id.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citation omitted).
Todd A. Nist, Finding the Right Approach: A Constitutional Alternative for
Shielding Kids from Harmful Materials Online, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 451, 454

26.

(2004); The Supreme Court recently noted, "our cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to the
Internet." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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of age of material defined to be obscene on the basis of its appeal to them
whether or not it would be obscene to adults."27 Although the Court's opinion did not anticipate the creation of the Internet, Justice Brennan noted, "the
State has an interest 'to protect the welfare of children' and to see that they
are 'safeguarded from abuses' which might prevent their 'growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens.' "28 Ginsberg ultimately
stands for the proposition that legislatures may attempt to prevent minors
from being exposed to obscene and indecent sexual depictions.
However, since Ginsberg, legislatures have struggled to avoid using
content-based restrictions.29 In TBS, Inc. v. FCC, the Court defined contentbased restrictions as "laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech
from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based."30 According to the Court, "[t]he principal inquiry in determining
content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys."31 More importantly, "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid"32 and are
therefore subjected to strict scrutiny.33 Under strict scrutiny, "[i]f a statute
regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote
a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would
serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative."34
On the other hand, statutes which contain content-neutral restrictions are only
subject to intermediate scrutiny.35
As the following section demonstrates, Congress has generally been incapable of persuading courts to uphold content-based restrictions.
III.

A.

PREVIOUS CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS

Communications Decency Act

In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act ("CDA")
as a part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The CDA attempted to
protect children from online pornography in two ways. 36 First, it prohibited
27.
28.

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968).
Id. at 641 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).

29.

TBS, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 623 (1994).

30. Id. at 643.
31. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
32. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
33.

Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 932 (1997).

34.

United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).

35.

Phillips, 107 F.3d at 172.

36.

Novak, supra note 7, at 328.
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individuals from knowingly transmitting obscene or indecent material to any
person under eighteen years of age. 37 The statute provided that:
Whoever in interstate or foreign communications. . .by means of a
telecommunications device knowingly (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or child pornography, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication. . .shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.38
Second, section 223(d) stated that:
Whoever (1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive
computer service to display in a manner available to a person
under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, is obscene or child pornography, regardless of whether the user of such service placed
the call or initiated the communication . . . shall be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both39
The statute provided persons prosecuted for violating its terms with two affirmative defenses. The first defense protected individuals who took "reasonable, effective, and appropriate" measures to limit access by minors.40
The second defense protected individuals that restricted access by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number.41
The CDA's only real success was its passage. Immediately after President Clinton signed it into law, several groups filed lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of the "indecent transmission" provision and the "patently
offensive display" provision.4 2 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania "preliminary enjoined" the Government "from enforcing, prosecuting, investigating

37. Id.; see 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (2000).
38. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B) (2000).
39. Id. § 223(d)(1).
40. Novak, supra note 7, at 329; see 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A).
41.

Novak, supra note 7, at 329; see 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(B).

42. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861 (1997); see also Novak, supra note 7, at 330
(discussing the legal history of the CDA).
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or reviewing" the challenged provisions.43 The Government appealed the
district court's holding to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding in Reno v.
ACLU.44 In the course of doing so, the Court made several important findings. First, the Court found that the CDA is a "content-based regulation of
speech."45 Second, and more importantly, the Court held that the challenged
provisions were facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.46
According to the Court, in attempting to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech, the challenged provisions effectively suppressed speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.47
Moreover, proponents of the CDA failed to demonstrate that less restrictive
alternatives would not be equally as effective.48
The Court also found the CDA constitutionality deficient for a host of
other reasons. For example, the Court found that the statute's scope was
ambiguous because "each of the two parts of the CDA use[ ] a different linguistic form. The first uses the word 'indecent,' while the second speaks of
material that 'in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities of organs[.]"49 The Court was particularly concerned with the statute's
vagueness because of the potential "chilling effect on free speech."50 Furthermore, because the CDA is a criminal statute, "[t]he severity of criminal
sanctions may . . . cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate
even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images."51 Lastly, the Court found
the affirmative defenses insufficient to save the constitutionality of the Act.52
B.

Child Online Protection Act

In direct response to the CDA being struck down, Congress passed the
Child Online Protection Act ("COPA") as a part of the Omnibus Consoli43.

ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

44.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).

45.

Id. at 871.

46.

Id. at 864.

47.

Id. at 874.

48.

Id. at 879.

49.

Id. at 870-71 (citations omitted).

50.

Id. at 871-72.

51.

Id.
at 872.

52.

Id.at 882 (stating "[w]e agree with the District Court's conclusion that the
CDA places an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech, and that the
defenses do not constitute the sort of 'narrow tailoring' that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision").
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dated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999.53 COPA
was drafted with the specific intention of remedying the CDA's defects.54
The Act made it illegal for a person to knowingly make, through the Internet,
any communication for commercial purposes that is harmful to minors, unless the person makes a good faith effort to restrict access by minors to the
communication.55 Moreover, under the terms of the statute, violators are susceptible to criminal and civil penalties.56
One of the distinguishing features of COPA was its specificity. The
statute defined "material prohibited to minors" as:
[A]ny communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article,
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or
that (A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to
pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or stimulated sexual act
or sexual contact, an actual or stimulated normal or
(C) perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and
(D) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value for minors.57
COPA also included safe harbors similar to those in the CDA.58

53.

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, Div. C, Tit. XIV § 1403 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231
(1999)).

54.

Novak, supra note 7, at 332. According to Emily Novak, "[t]he Committee
Report articulates that the bill strikes the appropriate balance between preserving the First Amendment rights of adults and protecting children from harmful
material on the World Wide Web in response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Reno v. ACLU." Id. at 332 n.36. See also H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 5
(1998).

55.

Novak, supra note 7, at 332; see also H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 5. One of the
most problematic aspects of COPA was that it only applied to pornography
which is commercially distributed. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 231 (2000). As a result, it made no effort to limit children from viewing
pornography which is not commercially distributed. H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at
5.

56.

See H.R REp. No. 105-775, at 5; see Novak, supra note 7, at 332-33.

57.

47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000).

58.

Specifically the Act provides:
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COPA, like the CDA, was challenged immediately after President Clinton signed it into law. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction largely on the grounds that COPA was not the least
restrictive means available to prevent minors from accessing harmful material on the Intemet.59
The Government appealed the preliminary injunction to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, but on different
grounds. It held that the "contemporary community standards" provision
was unconstitutionally overbroad.60 The court also found that removing this
provision would not salvage COPA because the standard was an essential
component of the statute. 6'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider one issue: whether the
Act's use of "contemporary community standards" to identify material harmful to minors runs afoul of the First Amendment.62 The Court held that
"COPA's reliance on community standards to identify 'material that is harmful to minors' does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for
purposes of the First Amendment."63 The Court rejected the Third Circuit's
finding that the "contemporary community standards" provision would require "all speakers on the Web to abide by the 'most puritan' community's
standards." 64 According to Justice Clarence Thomas, unlike the CDA,
COPA "applies to significantly less material.., and defines the harmful-tominors material restricted by the statute in a manner parallel to the Miller
definition of obscenity."65

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the defendant, in good faith has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors -

(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or
adult personal identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available
technology.
Id. at § 231(c)(1).

59. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 496-97 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see Sue Ann
Mota, Protecting Minors from Sexually Explicit Materials on the Net: COPA
Likely Violates the FirstAmendment According to the Supreme Court, 7 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 95, 100-106 (2005) (discussing COPA's legal history).
60.

ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173-77 (3d Cir. 2000).

61.

Id. at 177-80.

62.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).

63.

Id. at 585.

64.

Id. at 577 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 2000)).

65.

Id. at 578.
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On remand, the Third Circuit again reaffirmed the district court's preliminary injunction. The court held that COPA does not satisfy strict scrutiny, which requires a statute to "(1) serve a compelling governmental
interest; (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) be the least
restrictive means of advancing that interest."66 The court found that protecting children from harmful material on the Web is a compelling governmental
interest.67 However, the court opined that COPA's provisions regarding
"material harmful to minors,"68 "commercial purposes,"69 and its affirmative
defenses7o were not narrowly tailored to accomplish this task. The court also
found that COPA was not the least restrictive alternative available to Congress. According to the court, "various blocking and filtering techniques...
may be substantially less restrictive than COPA in achieving COPA's objective of preventing a minor's access to harmful material."71 Finally, the court
found that COPA suffers from "substantial overbreadth" as a result of numerous "unconstitutionally vague" terms.7 2
In 2004, COPA went before the Supreme Court for a second time. In a
5-4 decision, the Court upheld the Third Circuit's decision to allow the injunction to stand and remanded the case to the district court pending a full
trial on the merits.73 Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy began by rebutting the Third Circuit's contention that the least restrictive alternative inquiry begins "with the status quo of existing regulations, then
ask[ing] whether the challenged restriction has some additional ability to
achieve Congress' legitimate interest."74 Applying this analysis, any speech
restriction can be justified.75 Rather, "the court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective
alternatives."76

Using this analysis, the Court found that blocking and filtering software
are less restrictive alternatives than COPA.77 According to the Court, block-

ing and filtering software are less restrictive because they permit the receiver
66.
67.
68.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Sable
Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 251-55.

69.

Id. at 256-57.

70.

Id. at 257-61.

71.

Id. at 265.

72.
73.

Id. at 266-71.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 659, 673 (2004).

74.

Id. at 666.

75. Id.
76. Id.

77.

Id. at 666-67.
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to determine what material he receives without criminally condemning a category of speech.78 The Court acknowledged that filtering software has a tendency to be over or under-inclusive.79 The Court brushed off this concern by
noting, "[w]hatever the deficiencies of filters . . . the Government failed to
introduce specific evidence proving that existing technologies are less effective than the restrictions in COPA."80
The Court cited three additional reasons for allowing the injunction to
stand pending a full trial on the merits. First, reversing the injunction may
cause "a serious chill upon protected speech" because speakers may censor
themselves "rather than risk the perils of trial."81 Second, substantial factual
disputes remain on the record.82 And finally, "the factual record does not

reflect current technological realit[ies]

. . .83

Scant attention has been given to Justice Kennedy's rejection of the
Government's "argument that filtering software is not an available alternative
because Congress may not require it to be used."84 Justice Kennedy felt that
this "argument carries little weight, because Congress undoubtedly may act
to encourage the use of filters" pointing out that the Court has "held that
Congress can give strong incentives to schools and libraries to use them."85
Here, Justice Kennedy was presumably referring to the Children's Internet
Protection Act (CIPA). CIPA, which will be discussed in greater detail in the
following section, requires schools and libraries receiving federal funds for
Internet access to use a "technology protection measure" that blocks or filters
Internet access to "visual depictions that are obscene, [involve] child pornography, or [which are] 'harmful to minors.'"86 Justice Kennedy went on to
state, "COPA presumes that parents lack the ability, not the will, to monitor
what their children see. By enacting programs to promote use of filtering
software, Congress could give parents that ability without subjecting protected speech to severe penalties."87
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reaffirmed its permanent injunction against the enforcement

78.

Id. at 667.

79.

Id. at 668-69.

80.

Id. at 668.

81.

Id. at 670-71.

82.
83.
84.

Id. at 671.
Id.
Id. at 669.

85.
86.

Id.
Children's Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(1) (2003); see Russell B. Weekes, Cyber-Zoning a Mature Domain: The Solution to Preventing
Inadvertent Access to Sexually Explicit Content on the Internet?, 8 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 4 (2003) (discussing the statutory provisions of CIPA).

87.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004).
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of COPA.88 The district court cited three reasons for its holding. First, applying strict scrutiny, the court found that COPA is not narrowly tailored to
Congress' compelling interest of "protecting minors from harmful material
on the Web"89 because it is over and under-inclusive.9o The statute is overinclusive because its "broad definitions and provisions ... prohibit[ I] much
more speech than is necessary to further Congress' compelling interest."9'
COPA is under-inclusive because it "is not applicable to a large amount of
material that is unsuitable for children which originates overseas but is nevertheless available to children in the United States."92 The court also held that
COPA's affirmative defenses do not sufficiently tailor the statute to Congress' compelling interest.93
Second, the Government failed to show that COPA is the least restrictive and most effective alternative for achieving Congress' compelling interest.94 According to the court, the Government failed to rebut the plaintiffs'
assertion that "filter software and the Government's promotion and support
thereof is a less restrictive alternative to COPA."95 Moreover, although
COPA has never been enforced, the Government "failed to show that filters
are not at least as effective as COPA at protecting minors from harmful material on the Web."96 The court acknowledged that filtering technology is not
perfect, but was ultimately persuaded by its ability to "block sexually explicit
foreign material" and to provide parents with the opportunity to "customize
filter settings depending on the ages of their children and what type of content they find objectionable."97 The court also notes that "filters are fairly
easy to install and use." 98 However, the court fails to take into account that
many parents are not aware about the existence, much less the benefits, of
filtering software.99
Lastly, the court held that COPA suffers from vagueness and overbreadth. With respect to COPA's vague provisions, the court discusses cer-

88. ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
89.

Id. at 809.

90. Id. at 810.
91.

Id.

92. Id.
93.

Id. at 811.

94.

Id. at 813-814.

95.

Id. at 813.

96.

Id. at 814.

97.

Id. at 815.

98.

Id.

99.

See infra Part III.B.
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tain language used in one section of the statute, but omitted or simply never
defined in another.100 On the issue of overbreadth, the court states,
[B]ecause a story that might have "serious literary value" for a
sixteen-year-old could be considered to appeal to the "prurient interest" of an eight-year-old and be "patently offensive" and without "serious value" to that child, Web publishers do not have fair
notice regarding what they can place on the Web that will not be
considered harmful to "any person under 17 years of age."'o,
The court was further troubled because the statute never explicitly stated that
it was only intended for "commercial pornographers."02
C.

Children's Internet Protection Act

In 2000, Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act.103
The Act addresses libraries that receive federal subsidies via Internet access
discounts and support under the Telecommunications Act of 1996104 or
from grants under the Library Services and Technology Act.105 The Act
requires these libraries "to have in place certain Internet safety policies that
protect both minors and adults from visual depictions which are obscene and
involve child pornography, and for computers used by minors, visual
depictions harmful to minors."06 Upon request, authorized persons may dis-

100. ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 816-19 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
101. Id. at 819.
102. Id. at 820.
103. Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000).
104. Id. § 254(h)(1)(B) (This section includes the Schools and Libraries programs
(or E-rate), through which telecommunication carriers provide services to libraries and schools, at a lower rate than is charged to others).
105. 20 U.S.C. § 9121 (Supp. IV 2004) (This program distributes funds to libraries
"to assist in accessing information through networks and pay costs associated
with Internet accessible computers."); see Mota, supra note 59, at 107 n.120.
106. See Mota, supra note 59, at 107 (discussing the provisions of 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(h)); see 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(7) (G) (stating that:
"Harmful to minors" refers to any picture, image, graphic image file, or
other visual depiction that i) - taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion;
ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or
sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or a
lewd exhibition of the genitals; and iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as to minors.")
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able the protection measure for bona fide research or other lawful
purposes. 107
Like Congress' previous efforts to prevent children from accessing
harmful material on the Internet, CIPA was challenged instantly. In a suit
brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a group of public libraries,
library associations, library patrons, and website publishers alleged that the
Act was unconstitutional because it requires libraries to forego their First
Amendment rights in order to receive federal funds and induces libraries to
restrict their patrons' First Amendment rights.108 The district court found
that the Act should be subjected to strict scrutiny because "[s]oftware filters,
by definition, block access to speech on the basis of its content."109 Applying
this standard of scrutiny, the district court found that the filtering software
was not narrowly tailored, 10 and that less restrictive alternatives exist."I Accordingly, the district court held that CIPA was "facially invalid under the
First Amendment" and permanently enjoined its enforcement.112
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court.1 3 The issue
before the Court was "whether the condition that Congress requires (use of
filtering software) 'would ... be unconstitutional' if performed by the library
itself."'14 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, concluded
that the use of filtering software by public libraries does not violate the First
Amendment rights of library patrons.' '5 Thus, CIPA does not require libraries to violate the Constitution and, as such, is a legitimate exercise of power
by Congress under the Spending Clause.116
The Court also determined that the district court erred in subjecting
CIPA to strict scrutiny."i7 According to the Court, a public library's "need to
exercise judgment in making collection decisions depends on its traditional
role in identifying suitable and worthwhile material."118 As institutions en47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(D) (stating that "any person under seventeen years of
age is a minor.").
107. § 254(h)(5)(D).
108. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
109. Id. at 454 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
813 (2000)).
110. Id. at 475-79.
111. Id. at 480-84.
112. Id. at 496.
113. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
114. Id. at 203 n.2 (quoting Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 453).
115. Id. at 214.

116. Id.
117. Id.at 207 n.3 (quoting S. REP. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999)).
118. Id. at 208.
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trusted to promote and encourage the proliferation of knowledge, most libraries elect to "exclude pornography from their print collections because they
deem it inappropriate for inclusion."li'9 Because these decisions are not subjected to heightened scrutiny, "it would make little sense to treat libraries'
judgments to block online pornography any differently, when these judgments are made for just the same reason."120 Accordingly, "[i]n deciding not
to collect pornographic material from the Internet, a public library need not
satisfy a court that it has pursued the least restrictive means of implementing
that decision."121
Ultimately, the Court determined that because public libraries retain
their First Amendment rights, CIPA does not inhibit those libraries that
choose to provide unfiltered access to patrons; rather, it merely "reflects
Congress' decision not to subsidize their doing so."122
IV.

SOLUTION: MANDATORY CHOICE

The CDA and COPA represent one school of thought on how to prevent
children from accessing online pornography: content-based restrictions with
criminal and civil sanctions for violators.123 As a result of their status as
content-based restrictions, both statutes were subject to the highest standard
of review, strict scrutiny. The fate of both statutes demonstrates that strict
scrutiny is a very difficult standard to satisfy. Accordingly, Congress should
refrain from attempting to pass substantively similar statutes.
The second, and preferable, alternative is the use of blocking and filtering software. On more than one occasion, the Court has specifically noted
that blocking and filtering software are less restrictive and more effective
means of preventing children from viewing pornography on the Internet.124
In fact, even a congressionally established commission found that blocking
and filtering software are effective alternatives that pose relatively few First

119. Id.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 207 n.3.
122. Id. at 212.

123. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
124. See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 672 (2004) (holding that the
Government did not show that the less restrictive alternatives should be disregarded and may indeed be more effective than the provisions of COPA); see
generally Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 197 (expressing the view that filtering

software can easily be disabled and that no better alternative had been
presented).
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Amendment concerns.125 In passing CIPA, Congress itself seemed to recognize and acknowledge this fact.
A.

Blocking and Filtering Technology

An adequate discussion regarding the solution this article proposes requires explaining how blocking and filtering software work. At the most
basic level, filtering software "allow[s] material or activities that are deemed
inappropriate to be blocked, so that the individual using that filtered computer cannot gain access to that material or participate in those activities."126
Virtually all software companies use a combination of technology and human
judgment to determine what constitutes inappropriate content.1 27 The process
generally involves three steps. First, websites are classified into pre-determined categories, such as "Adults Only," "Drugs," "Religion," and "Violence."128 Software companies create pre-determined categories by
compiling "huge lists of Web addresses by following links from online directories .

. .,

by doing key word searches on ordinary search engines, and by

reviewing reports of newly-registered domain names."29 In the second step,
each flagged website is examined with automated systems that utilize
keyword analysis.130 Based on this analysis, websites are recommended for
inclusion in particular categories.31 Third, "a human receiver, at least in
some companies .

. .,

makes the final decision" regarding how a website

should be categorized. 132 Unless requested to do so, most filtering companies
125.

COMM'N ON CHILD ONLINE PROT., REPORT TO CONGRESS

19-20 (2000), availa-

ble at http://www.copacommission.org/report/COPAreport.pdf
COPA Report].
126.

[hereinafter

COMM. TO STUDY TOOLS AND STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING KIDS FROM POR-

NOGRAPHY, NATI'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE IN-

2.3.1. (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin. eds., 2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/htm/youth/intemet (last visited Feb. 12, 2007) [hereinafter

TERNET

Youth, Pornography,and the Internet].

127. Id. at 21.
128. See Betsy A. Bernfeld, Free Speech and Sex on the Internet: Court Clips
COPA's Wings, but Filtering May Still Fly, 6 WYO. L. REV. 223, 237 (2004)
(discussing

BENJAMIN EDELMAN,

EXPERT REPORT OF BENJAMIN

EDELMAN,

available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/aclu- 101501 .pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2007)). According to Bemfeld, "the programs include
one or more categories for sexually explicit materials, such as "Extreme/Obscene/Violence," "Mature," "Nudity," and "Sex." See BENJAMIN EDELMAN, ExPERT REPORT OF BENJAMIN EDELMAN, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.
edu/people/edelman/pubs/aclu-101501.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
129. Bernfeld, supra note 128, at 237 n.15.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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do not "re-review

the contents"

of websites

after they have

been

categorized. 133
Based on the analysis described above, four filter options have been
developed: "client-side filters, content-limited Internet service providers,
server-side filters, and search engine filters."'34 Client-side filters are installed in computers and a person with a password configures the profile of
the system, which prevents others from accessing material that is deemed
inappropriate.135 Content-limited Internet service providers provide and restrict access to certain subsets of the Internet for all subscribers.136 Serverside filters require "users at all access points" to conform to a pre-determined
access policy.137 As a result, they are frequently used in institutional settings,
such as school districts and libraries.138 Lastly, "search engine filters when
activated by the user do not return links to inappropriate content found in a
139
search, but they do not block access to specifically named Web sites."'
Significant attention has been given to blocking and filtering software's
shortcomings. The primary complaints are that the software is under and
over-inclusive.40 A filter is under-inclusive when it fails to block websites
with indecent material.141 This occurs when the software "relies on pre-es-

133. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
With respect to requests to re-review particular categorizations, there is no
guarantee that filtering companies do so in an accurate or timely fashion.
While this is problematic, it does not directly affect the proposal made in this
article. For the purposes of the proposal made in this argument, the only thing
that matters is that websites that are filtered as a result of their categorization
have some method of requesting that that categorization be re-reviewed.
134. See Novak, supra note 7, at 355 (providing a more complete discussion regarding filters).
135.

YOUTH,

PORNOGRAPHY, AND

THE INTERNET,

supra note 126, at 12.1.1; see No-

vak, supra note 7, at 355.
136. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 126, at 12.1.1; see Novak, supra note 7, at 355-56.
137. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 126, at 12.1.1; see Novak, supra note 7, at 356.
138. Novak, supra note 7, at 356.
139. See id. (explaining YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 126,
at 12.1.1). Generally speaking, when "a user attempts to access a Web site or
page that is blocked by the filter, the user is immediately presented with a
screen that indicates that a block has occurred as a result of the operation of the
filtering software. These 'denial screens' appear only at the point that a user
attempts to access a site or page in an enabled category." Am. Library Ass'n v.
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
140. Merlis, supra note 6, at *35.
141. Id.
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tablished lists to filter out indecent websites."142 Unless the software is updated on a regular basis, these lists date quickly.143 Filters are also underinclusive because they rely on text analysis.144 Text analysis is incapable of
appropriately identifying and restricting access to indecent images.145 As a
result, it is not uncommon for websites with images but no text to bypass a
filter's grip.4 6 Software providers have attempted to address this shortcoming by developing filters that identify "large expanses of what is likely to be
flesh in an image."47 Unfortunately, this technology is "highly errorprone."148

Filters, on the other hand, are over-inclusive when they block websites
that contain material that is not indecent. 49 This typically occurs because
filters cannot properly analyze the meaning of text. As a result, "filters
sometimes block educational websites containing words typically associated
with indecent publications."150 In order to preempt complaints that their
software is ineffective, which may occur with under-inclusive blocking,
51
many manufacturing companies pre-configure over-inclusive settings.'
The most serious threat posed by over-inclusive filters is their potential
to degrade the First Amendment through censorship. Unless a user is knowledgeable about the filter's settings, it is possible that he could unknowingly
be denied access to speech that he is constitutionally entitled to receive.152
This argument is most effective in public settings, such as public libraries,
where users are unable to adjust the filter's settings.153 However, it fails to
apply "to filters voluntarily used in private homes."154 If a user is unsatisfied

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Kevin W. Saunders, Do Children Have the Same FirstAmendment
Rights as Adults?: The Need for a Two (or More) Tiered FirstAmendment to
Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 257, 259
(2004)).
147. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 1248, at 56; see
Weekes, supra note 866, at 68 n.143.

148. Id.
149. Merlis, supra note 6, at *36.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id. at *37.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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with the settings, assuming he is adequately informed regarding those settings, he can simply "adjust the filters or remove the filters altogether."55
B.

Mandating an Affirmative Choice

In Ashcroft, the Government argued that the primary reason for Congress' apprehension to the use of filters was that "Congress may not require"
their use.' 56 The Court rejected this argument on the basis that "Congress
may act to encourage such use ... by promoting the development of filters
by industry and their use by parents."157 Although the Court is correct, its
argument does nothing to address the fact that a significant number of parents are not aware or knowledgeable about the existence and benefits of fil59
ters.158 This, in turn, suggests that parents "will fail to act."'
Instead of merely providing parents with incentives to acquire blocking
or filtering software, Congress should pass a law 160 requiring all new computers' 6' to come with pre-installed blocking and filtering software. The
software should require the purchaser (or first user) to make a mandatory
affirmative choice,162 during the initial setup, regarding the software's settings on each user's account for that computer. 63 Such a law may take the
following form:

155. Id.
156. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 658 (2004).
157. Id.
158. Merlis, supra note 6, at *39.
159. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000).
160. Given that virtually all activity on the Internet is interstate by nature, Congress
could pass such a law under the auspices of the Commerce Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Because virtually all computers have the ability to
connect to the Internet and filtering software impacts online activities, the
Commerce Clause provides Congress with ample authority to pass such a law.
161. The law should apply to desktops as well as notebooks. This is due primarily
to the strength of notebook sales. In 2005, "[n]otebooks accounted for 50.9
percent of personal computers bought at retail ... while desktops accounted for
49.1 percent." Michael Kanellos, Notebooks Pass Desktops in U.S. Retail,
CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 1, 2006, http://news.com/Notebooks+pass+desktops+
in+U.S.+retail/2100-1044_3-6033967.html.
162. This amounts, in essence, to a client-side filter.
163. See Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern ContractScholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 899
n.79 (2003). According to Professor Ayres, an "affirmative choice rule is a
type of penalty default that forces contractors to make an affirmative choice in
order to create a contract." Id. Here, if the user does not make a decision
regarding the software's settings, during the initial setup, he will simply not be
able to use the computer.
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In recognition of the threat that pornography and other indecent and
harmful materials on the World Wide Web poses to America's youth, and to
limit the opportunities for minors to be exposed to such materials,
(a) Computer manufacturers.
1. Computer manufactures shall include blocking and filtering software
on all personal desktops and laptops sold in the United States;
2. that includes a menu requiring the activating user to affirmatively
select whether to block and filter particular Internet categories for each account on the computer; and
3. include a label on the packaging of the computer that informs the user
that an affirmative choice regarding blocking and filtering settings must be
made in order to activate the computer.
(b) Software requirements.
1. The software must require action by the activating user during the
computer's initial set-up;
2. contain a menu listing all possible categories that a user may select to
block or filter;
3. contain no pre-checked categories;
4. adequately inform and explain to the activating user the purpose of
the software, how the software works, the types of websites that may be
blocked by selecting to block and filter a particular category, and all other
relevant information;
5. create a menu on the activating user's account that allows the activating user to change the settings at any time; and
6. require the activating user to create a password to access the menu for
changing the blocking and filtering settings.
A law incorporating these provisions would address virtually every concern
enunciated by Congress and the courts.
As the previous subsection demonstrated, filters that depend upon user
involvement in private homes do not upset the First Amendment. Filters,
unlike content-based restrictions, "impose selective restrictions on speech at
the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source."64 Including a
menu that lists all the possible categories that may be blocked165 and requir-

164. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2004).
165. For example, N2H2 Bess/i2100 offers the following categories: "Adults Only;
Alcohol; Auction; Chat; Drugs; Electronic Commerce; Employment Search;
Free Mail; Free Pages; Gambling; Games; Hate/Discrimination; Illegal; Jokes;
Lingerie; Message/Bulletin Boards; Murder/Suicide; News; Nudity; Personal
Information; Personals; Pornography; Profanity; Recreation/Entertainment;
School Cheating Information; Search Engines; Search Terms; Sex; Sports;
Stocks; Swimsuits; Tasteless/Gross; Tobacco; Violence; and Weapons." Am.
Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Moreover, "N2H2 offers seven 'exception categories,"' which include "Education, Filtered Search Engine, For Kids, History, Medical, Moderated, and Text/
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ing users to make a conscious and affirmative choice regarding whether to
filter websites that are identified as "Adults Only," "Drugs," "Religion" or
"Violence,"166 would not upset the First Amendment because users would
retain the ability to program the settings according to their own preferences. 167 Adults, with or without children, would be able to gain access to
protected speech by simply turning off the technology on their personal accounts. Moreover, Congress could minimize any potential allegations that the
statute violates the First Amendment by including a provision that requires
the software to adequately inform users of the likely effects associated with
selecting to block and filter a particular category. This would ensure that any
censorship is self-imposed.168 In the end, only children would have their In-

Spoken Only. When an exception category is enabled, access to any Web site
or page via a URL associated with both a category and an exception ...will be
allowed, even if the customer has enabled the product to otherwise ... block
the category .... " Id. at 428-29.
SmartFilter provides the following categories: "Anonymizers/Translators;
Art & Culture; Chat; Criminal Skills; Cults/Occult; Dating; Drugs; Entertainment; Extreme/Obscene/Violence; Gambling; Games; General News; Hate
Speech; Humor; Investing; Job Search; Lifestyle; Mature; MP3 Sites; Nudity;
On-line Sales; Personal Pages; Politics, Opinion & Religion; Portal Sites; SelfHelp/Health; Sex; Sports; Travel; Usenet News; and Webmail." Id. at 429.
166. Bernfeld, supra note 128, at 237.
167. Borrowing further from Professor Ayres' concepts, a statute that requires computer companies to include filtering software which forces the activating user
to make an affirmative choice regarding the software's settings for each account on the computer would serve as the functional equivalent of a legislative
imposed mandatory, open-ended contractual menu. According to Professor
Ayres, "[a] menu is a contractual offer that empowers the offeree to accept
more than one type of contract." Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CH. L. REv.
3, 3 (2006). The mandatory menu would run between two private parties: the
computer company that includes the software and the computer purchaser.
Moreover, the menu would be open-ended because the activating user would
have the freedom to select from a variety of different filtering settings.
In practice, a mandatory, open-ended contractual menu would "protect
those who need protecting (parents that are not aware or knowledgeable about
the threat posed by online pornography and the benefits of filtering technology)
without restricting the freedom of those who can do just fine on their own" and
provide the offeree (the parent) with an opportunity to "opt-in" to the settings
of his liking. Id. at 4, 8 (alteration in original); see generally id. (explaining the
use of contractual menus).
168. In a recent online article, an ACLU spokesperson made the following argument
against the use of filtering software: "most blocking software prevents access
to sites based on criteria provided by the vendor," which implies that "somebody out there is making judgments about what is offensive and controversial,
judgments that may not coincide with [the user's judgment]. The First Amendment exists precisely to protect the most offensive and controversial speech
from government suppression." Harry Hochheiser, Censorship in a Box: Why
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ternet access restricted.169 Even then, parents would retain the ability to permit their children to view material they are prepared to handle.170
In order to avoid any semblance of a content-based restriction, it is absolutely essential that the law contain a provision requiring that the software
include no pre-checked categories. Although it is conceivable for a statute
mandating certain categories to come pre-checked to pass constitutional muster, 17' Congress should avoid taking any chances. A law requiring the activating user to affirmatively select each category he wants filtered would limit
computer and software manufacturers to merely presenting the user with a
list of categories available for restriction. Because the final decision to restrict access to certain categories would rest with the activating user, any
content-based restriction would occur as a result of the activating user's own
actions and, as a result, would not be constitutionally problematic.
A mandatory decision regarding the settings on each account would also
directly address Congress' concern that parents "will fail to act."172 Prior to
the release of Microsoft's Windows Vista, computers did not come equipped
with blocking and filtering software. Windows Vista includes a centralized
Blocking Software is Wrong for Public Libraries,ACLU, Sept. 16, 2002, http://

169.

170.

171.
172.

www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=13624&c=252; see Bemfeld, supra
note 128 (for a complete conversation regarding Hochheiser's article).
The ACLU spokesperson is correct that filtering software has the potential
to be over-inclusive. However, under the solution proposed in this article, the
activating user would make a conscious decision regarding what material he
wants filtered on each account. If the filtering manufacturer adequately explains to the activating user the effects of selecting each category, a user that
selects the most restrictive form of filtering would undoubtedly be aware that
he may be restricted from viewing material that is neither obscene nor indecent.
As a result, any First Amendment restriction would be self-imposed.
This is not problematic because "constitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."' Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)).
This could be accomplished several ways. First, the filtering software could
periodically ask the user that activates the computer to make an updated decision regarding each account's settings. Second, the filtering software should
include a menu on the activating user's account that allows him to update each
user's settings at his own leisure. A provision incorporating either of these
options could be included in the statute.
At a very minimum, the software would have to make it known to the user that
certain categories are pre-checked and provide the user with a clear opportunity
to accept or reject these selections.
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824-25 (2000).
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Parental Controls panel, as a part of the User Accounts and Family Safety
Control Panel applet, which "provides a centralized location where [the parent] can turn parental controls on and of; block or allow specific programs,
games, and websites; and set controls for every aspect of [a] child's computer
use."' 173 Although commendable, the mere inclusion of such software is insufficient because parents that are not technologically savvy may never use
or even know that the software is on their computer. In this respect, Windows Vista fails to provide adequate relief. However, by passing legislation
that requires a mandatory decision, parents would have no choice but to become familiar with filtering technology and to make an affirmative choice
regarding each account's settings.174
Congress should require that blocking and filtering software provide a
weekly summary to the activating user of all users' activities in order to
prevent technologically savvy children from avoiding the settings put in
place by their parents. 175 Functionally, this would operate similarly to monitoring devices, which act "as a deterrent rather than a preventative measure
because the parent monitors the child's online activity rather than blocking
material [and tihe threat of punishment or embarrassment will deter children
from viewing web sites that they know are unsuitable for their eyes."176

173. Microsoft Windows Vista, Parental Controls, http://www.microsoft.com/windows/products/windowsvista/features/details/parentalcontrols.mspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2007). According to Microsoft, "Internet Explorer 7 in Windows
Vista gives parents the ability to create filters and settings to block children's
access to objectionable content and approve access to trusted or acceptable
sites." Id.
174. A mandatory decision default is also superior to a filtered default because a
filtered default runs the risk of functioning as a form of content-regulation. If
the computer company and software manufacturer make the decision regarding
the computer's settings without the activating user's involvement, protected
speech may be filtered without the user's consent. This exact concern is the
reason that Congress should require computer companies and filtering manufacturers to include an open-ended menu which requires the activating user to
actively select the categories he wants filtered on each account. This will require computer companies and filtering manufacturers to adequately inform the
activating user of the types of websites that will [and may] be blocked if a
particular category is selected. If structured exactly along these lines, any content-regulation would result solely from the activating user's own choices.
175. Microsoft Windows Vista, supra note 173 (To Microsoft's credit, Windows
Vista contains, as a part of the Parental Controls panel, an activity report that
allows parents to monitor how their children have been using the computer.
Unfortunately, Vista's activity reports only appear when prompted by the user.
As a result, parents that are not knowledgeable about this feature may never use
it. However, requiring the activity report to appear at set times will ensure that
all parents review their children's activities on the Internet).
176. Novak, supra note 7, at 357.
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Moreover, a law incorporating the provisions proposed in this article
would place the onus back where it belongs: on parents. As Ginsberg recognized, "parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."'77 The current
problem is that parents are not completely aware of the threat that online
pornography poses to their children. Most parents are also not equipped with
the tools necessary to restrict their children's access to indecent material on
the Internet. Instead of taking it upon itself to say what minors can and
cannot view on the Internet, Congress should be mindful that parents have
the "primary responsibility for children's well-being [and] are entitled to the
support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."78 Ultimately, parents are in the best position to determine what material their children are prepared to view.
The release of Vista addresses two issues that would have arisen from
this proposal. The first concerns the financial burden associated with requiring all computers to come with blocking and filtering software. The second
concerns how computer companies should implement the blocking and filtering requirements. With respect to the financial implications, because such a
large percentage of computers that are sold in the United States include a
Microsoft operating system, 179 the cost of affixing such software to computers has already been largely internalized into the market.180 The only
mainstream alternative to a Microsoft operating system is Apple's Mac OS
X, which constitutes a mere five percent of the market for computers in the
United States.18 As a result, a law requiring inclusion of the software argued
for in this article -should not have a large financial impact on the ability of
most Americans to purchase computers. Lastly, assuming that Apple and
other computer manufacturers that do not use a Microsoft operating system
follow the example set by Microsoft, computer companies may find it more
cost efficient and less burdensome to develop their own blocking and filtering software.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although researchers may never be capable of demonstrating the exact
detrimental effects of pornography on minors, there is little doubt that online
pornography has the potential to severely harm the psychological develop177. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
178. Id.
179. Market Share, http://marketshare.hitslink.com/report.aspx?qprid=2&qpmr=15
&qpdt=l&qpct=3&qpcal=l&qptimeframe=M&qpsp=94 (last visited Sept. 25,
2007) (According to recent estimates, over 90% of computers in the United
States contain Microsoft operating systems.).
180. Assuming that Windows Vista becomes the standard operating system for all
personal computers that feature a Microsoft operating system.
181. Market Share, supra note 179.
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ment of children. In recognition of this fact, Congress cannot allow the constitutional fate of the CDA and COPA to dissuade it from continuing to
protect America's youth. The Supreme Court's decision to uphold the use of
blocking and filtering software in CIPA should persuade Congress to refrain
from passing laws containing content-based restrictions.
Instead, Congress should pass a law that requires all computer companies to include blocking and filtering software that requires the activating
user to make a mandatory, affirmative, and informed choice regarding the
software's settings for each account on the computer. Although blocking and
filtering software restricts material on the Internet on the basis of its content,
an informed user's active participation guarantees that any speech restriction
is self-imposed. Accordingly, blocking and filtering software does not violate the First Amendment right to, among other things, receive constitutionally protected speech. Moreover, requiring an activating user to make a
mandatory choice regarding other computer users' access level will shift the
burden of protecting children back to parents, while making sure that they are
adequately informed and equipped to act. In the final analysis, rearing children is an activity that is best left to parents. The solution proposed in this
article accomplishes this task, without violating the First Amendment, by
requiring parents to make a mandatory choice regarding what type of material their children may view on the Internet.

